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This thesis examines the reasons that consociational theory has been unable to unite
Iraq's disparate religious and ethnic communities and prevent sectarian violence. It
describes, analyzes and applies Arend Lijphart's theory of consociationalism to Iraq in
order to determine if the resulting instability stemmed from theoretical flaws, problems in
its application, or if specific characteristics of Iraqi culture caused the power-sharing
model to fail. In light of scholarly support for a consociational government i,n Iraq, this
proj ect will explore if consociationalism was attempted in Iraq, and if so, what went
wrong in its implementation. To do so, this thesis analyzes Iraq's constitutional
provisions in light of Lijphart's theory to determine that it was consociational. Having
established this, the thesis then highlights the divisive nature of Iraq's constitutional
process and the intensified Shi'a-Sunni tensions that resulted. Lastly, it considers
theoretical criticisms of consociationalism with regard to Iraq, specifically highlighting
the role of key Shi'a and Sunni leaders in eroding inter-ethnic relations. This analysis of
consociationalism's failure in Iraq highlights the points of departure from inter-group
cooperation in Iraq and draw conclusions about the causes for current Shi'a-Sunni
tensions.
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PART I: INTRODUCTION
1. CONSOCIATIONALISM IN IRAQ
Despite scholarly hope that a "power-sharing" government could unite Iraq's
ethnic communities by inducing them to cooperate, the rampant sectarian violence,
disillusionment with the government, and an alienated political elite in 2006 prove that
this has not been successful. In 2006, Iraq reported record casualties, increased Sunni-
Shi'a violence and an Iraqi government that has been unable to successfully curb these
inter-ethnic tensions. Foreseeing and hoping to avoid this very problem, in 2004 and
2005, many political scientists and military strategists theorized about the best way to
stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Many believed that Arend Lijphart's model of
consociationalism could create a stability in an otherwise ethnically divided Iraq.
Lijphart believes that consociationalism, a system of government designed to address
ethnic tensions through a cooperative political elite and formalized power-sharing
institutions, "open[s] up the possibility of viable democracy even where the social
conditions appear unpromising" to its establishment.! Given Iraq's prominent ethnic
divisions and tense Sunni-Shi'a relationship, such a model could be ideal to address the
concerns of each community. Accordingly, ifIraq's constitution did reflect these
consociational principles, the 2006 instability and violent Shi'a militias and Sunnis
insurgent groups are surprising and suggest the consociational model was unsuccessful.
With consideration of these problems, this paper will explore if consociationalism was
ever fully attempted in Iraq, and if so, endeavor to identify the problems in its
implementation that resulted in the current instability and sectarian violence.
1 Arend Lijphart, Politics ofAccommodation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). 211.
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2Evaluation of this recent attempt at consociationalism will reveal the importance
of Lijphart's favorable factors, the impact of external actors, and highlight problems that
may have contributed to the ultimate failure of power-sharing. In context of Lijphart's
assertions that consociationalism could theoretically work despite unfavorable conditions,
study of its attempt in Iraq will emphasize processes and factors to be prioritized to best
ensure future successes. Such insights could prove useful in future attempts at
consociationalism. Specifically, this examination will evaluate the importance of efforts
to avoid procedural problems in constitutional drafting or endeavors to induce some of
Lijphart's favorable factors when they are not otherwise present. As a recent example of
an attempt at consociationalism in an ethnically divided society, Iraq's application of
Lijphart's theoretical model demonstrates much about the practical application of power-
sharing governments.
II. METHODOLOGY
To determine if Iraq's constitution is consociational, and if so, why it did not
work to ameliorate ethnic tensions, I will examine this case study in light of
consociational theory. In order to evaluate the consociational nature of post-Saddam Iraq,
I will first describe Lijphart's theory of consociationalism and explain the criteria of
consociational governments. To establish the need for this in Iraq, I will then look at its
divided ethnic communities and the consequent need to establish a government that will
incorporate minority perspectives into a coalition government. Additionally, I will
establish that both military strategy and scholarly position papers advocated a
consociational government in Iraq, lending additional credibility to the need to examine
Lijphart's theory's applicability. Having thus established the need for a power-sharing
3government, I will analyze Iraq's proposed 2005 constitutional provisions to determine
their compliance with Lijphart's criteria for a consociational state. Through this analysis,
I will ascertain the nature of Iraq's constitution and its adherence with consociationalism.
Upon determination that consociationalism was in fact attempted in Iraq, I will
examine the reasons for the 2006 instability and sectarian violence. Through
examination of the constitutional drafting and ratification process, I will determine key
events and factors that alienated Sunni and Shi'a leaders and exacerbated inter-ethnic
tensions, as these factors likely also decreased the likelihood of the elite cooperation
needed in consociationalism. In light ofthese procedural problems, perhaps Iraq was not
well suited to a consociational government. An application of Lijphart's and other
theorists' outlined favorable factors likely to yield a stable power-sharing system to Iraqi
society will reveal whether such optimistic support for consociationalism in Iraq was
justified. Application of these theoretical criteria to Iraq's societal characteristics may
explain some of the reasons for its failure. Lastly, I will look at some theoretical
criticisms of consociationalism to determine their applicability to Iraq. Depending on
these criticisms and Iraq-specific factors, these could also help account for
consociationalism's failure in Iraq.
Additionally, as these procedural and theoretical problems question the feasibility
of consociational governments, I will consider the problems in Iraq in comparison to
consociational efforts in other countries in order to reveal if they are typical ofpower-
sharing governments. Specifically, I will look at Lebanon's consociational government
as a regionally relevant example. Through examination of the constitution and Lijphart's
4theory, I will determine key factors that have caused Iraq's instability and increased
Sunni-Shi'a tension.
PART II: EXAMINING CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY
III. AREND LIJPHART'S THEORY
Political science theorist Arend Lijphart's theory of consociationalism outlines a
method to construct democracies in ethnically divided societies through political
institutions that accept community differences and manage conflict. As a formal system
to promote government through power-sharing, consociationalism has been successfully
used in plural nations like The Netherlands and Switzerland, and with limited success in
Northern Ireland or India, in order to manage inter-group conflict and prevent violent
ethnic-based civil war. Based on its past success, many political scientists have identified
consociationalism as an optimal model in the construction of new democracies.
According to Lijphart, emerging democracies require increased efforts to
incorporate diverse ethnic and religious minorities into the government. Ethnic divisions
often form the basis of political cleavages, which then translate into conflicting demands
for political power.2 Moreover, Lijphart notes that it is:
more difficult to establish and maintain democratic government in divided
than in homogeneous countries. The experts also agree that the problem of
ethnic and other deep divisions is greater in countries that are not yet
democratic or fully democratic than in well-established democracies, and
that such divisions present a major obstacle to democratization in the
twenty-first century.3
2 Alejandro Moreno, Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties and the Consolidation ofDemocracy (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1999) 17.
3 Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Democracies," Journal ofDemocracy 15.2 (2004).
5Consequently, the establishment of new democracies should emphasis institutions
designed to address ethnic tensions. Different cleavages' efforts to attain political
representation and power in nascent democracies often focus on "the redistribution
ofpower,,,4 and therefore the structure of new governing systems is often seen as a
tool to engineer such distribution of power. Given the prominence of political
cleavages and ethnic divisions in heterogeneous countries, Lijphart's theoretical
attempts to manage ethnic differences in democracies are especially relevant.
His definition of consociationalism evolved empirically from critical evaluation
ofthe unexpected political stability in The Netherlands, a country noted for its political,
religious, and class cleavages. These divisions were deeply entrenched in Dutch society,
and as such, The Netherland's political stability and peacefulness was somewhat
surprising to many political scientists. To explain this, Lijphart studied the unique
characteristics that enabled cross-community governance in The Netherlands to form the
backbone of his political theory of consociationalism. He also notes the aspects of
political and cultural life in The Netherlands that facilitated this stability and peace and
identifies them as societal factors conducive to consociationalism.
Lijphart's theory defines consociationalism as a power-sharing form of
democracy best suited to manage conflict between divided communities. Despite its
differences from majority-rule democracies, Lijphart believes that "consensus democracy
may be considered more democratic than majoritarian democracy in most respects"S
because it prioritizes inclusion of the electorate's myriad viewpoints. As such, the model
4 Alejandro Moreno, Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation ofDemocracy (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1999) 17
5 Arend Lijphart, Patterns ofDemocracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) 7.
----
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attempts to foster peace and stability in divided societies through an emphasis on
consensus-building between different ethnic groups. Additionally, Lijphart believes that
in societies with entrenched ethnic divisions, self-imposed separation from other groups
can be beneficial, as it allows communities to flourish while minimizing the potential for
conflict. With these guiding goals, consociational theory outlines four main criteria: a
grand coalition of political elite, proportionality, mutual veto and regional autonomy for
different ethnic communities.
A multiparty grand coalition comprised of elites, or political leaders, from
different societal communities governs consociational democracies. Lijphart encourages
these leaders to work across community boundaries. He believes that an enlightened elite
governing group will seek to compromise in a larger effort to maintain national stability.
Additionally, a government with many political parties may foster compromise as
different parties need to work together in order to build a majority in the government.
Lijphart further argues that consociational democracies should adhere to the
principle of proportionality. For Lijphart, proportionality means that government
resources must be allocated in rough proportion to the size of each minority (or majority)
group, including government funding, civil service positions, and educational
opportunities. This ensures that groups feel that they have fair access to government
resources. Furthermore, Lijphart advocates for proportional representation in elections6
to ensure fair legislative representation of different ethnic and religious groups.
Proportional representation is especially important in ethnically divided societies because
6 Lijphart advocates for party-list proportional representation, in which citizens vote for a political party,
and in proportion to the percentage ofoverall votes received, parties appoint candidates in accordance with
a prioritized list.
7it ensures fair representation in government and promotes the idea that the government is
responsive to the needs of all its constituents.
Lijphart's principle of mutual veto ensures that political elites work to
compromise and reach consensus. Such systems of mutual veto may involve
requirements of a supermajority to pass contentious legislation. For example, in
Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement, contentious bills like the annual government
budget require significant approval from all major groups. Such mechanisms promote
cross-community collaboration because a small majority must consider minority needs in
order to pass legislation. As such, all groups can participate and shape government action.
Lastly, consociationalism requires group autonomy. Autonomy for ethnic
communities can be, but does not need to be, achieved through the creation of separate
federal regions with the power to oversee and govern internal affairs. Though Iraq is not
currently a consociational government, Iraq's Kurdish region provides a good example of
regional autonomy because it has the power to oversee educational institutions and has a
strong internal political system.7 Group autonomy need not be limited to physically
separated regions, however. In cases where ethnic communities are not geographically
separate, autonomy can translate to regional funding control for community resources,
like schools and cultural institutions. This enables communities' self-determination and
the ability to feel that the government recognizes the unique needs of different
communities.
7 Brendan O'Leary, "Power-Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy for Iraq," The Future ofKurdistan
in Iraq (philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) 77.
---
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IV. FAVORABLE FACTORS FOR CONSOCIATIONALISM
In his theory of consociationalism, Lijphart posits that all societies could
successfully implement and benefit from a consociational model. Many scholars
criticized his theory because they claimed that it does not consider the individual
differences or specific needs of a given society. However, Lijphart claims that "power
sharing has proven to be the only democratic model that appears to have much chance of
being adopted in divided societies,,,g and insists that the model should be adapted or
varied to fit the needs of each country. Given the varying degrees of success of
consociationalism in societies ranging from Belgium and Bosnia to Northern Ireland and
Lebanon, it appears that consociationalism can manage ethnic differences and promote
stability to some extent in a wide range of cultural settings. These various case studies
suggests that, if applied with regard to the specific cultural, ethnic, political or historical
context of a given country, consociationalism can yield some degree of stability.
However, Lijphart further qualifies his claim that consociational power sharing is
the best option for ethnically divided countries through his empirical data regarding the
shared traits of countries that are more able to successfully implement the model.
Typically, these traits refer to either the political or social culture, or both.9 Since the
success of consociational democracies hinges upon cooperation between political elite of
different communities, factors that encourage political cooperation also contribute to the
success of consociationalism (See Appendix 2). These factors include a history of
political accommodation among political parties and elites, cross-community shared
perception of an external threat, and a pervasive desire to maintain national unity despite
8 Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Democracies," Journal ofDemocracy 15.2 (2004).
9 Matthijs Bogaards, "The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review," European
Journal ofPolitical Research 33.4 (1998) 475-496.
9ethnic differences. Furthermore, the previous existence of a multi-party political system
and overarching loyalty to a national government both also increase the likelihood of a
successful consociational democracy because they indicate that the political elite share a
commitment to a national government. These factors reveal a tendency for
consociationalism to be more successful in societies with a predisposition to cooperation
and an understanding of a multi-party power sharing system. Based on Lijphart's theory,
the presence or absence of these traits would help predict the extent of
consociationalism's success in Iraq ifit was to be attempted.
Consociationalism proponents Brendan 0'Leary and John McGarry expand upon
Lijphart's favorable factors and claim that benign external nations-supporting
consociational efforts within a given country can help foster a successful democracy. For
example, O'Leary and McGarry cite Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement efforts
to use consociationalism to unite Nationalists and Unionists. They argue that Northern
Ireland's attempts at consociationalism benefited from "benign exogenous action,,,lO and
specifically from the United Kingdom and Ireland. When considered in the context of
Lijphart's proposition that commonly perceived external threats unite disparate groups,
O'Leary and McGarry's additional criteria suggest that external actors must be perceived
as fair and equally favorable to all parties. If preference for a particular group is
perceived, this will create additional barriers to cooperation between ethnic cleavages
because it will create a seeming disparity and thus exacerbate ethnic tensions. Such
exacerbated Sunni-Shi'a will thus diminish the possibility of elite cooperation and, by
extension, consociationalism.
10 John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary. "Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its
Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland," Government &
Opposition, 41 (2006) 43-63.
-----
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Based on these factors, with special attention to Lijphart's claim that
consociationalism can succeed in any society and the problems posed by the seeming
contradictions between Lijphart's and O'Leary and McGarry's perception of external
actors, I will determine if the initial scholarly presence for a consociational Iraq was
rooted in these factors. Through examination of the presence, or lack thereof, of these
factors, I will argue that while consociationalism was still possible in accordance with
Lijphart's claim, implementation and procedural problems, a lack of favorable factors
and relevant theoretical critiques reduced the likelihood of its successful implementation.
PART III: A DIVIDED IRAQ
V. IRAQ DEMOGRAPHICS AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT
Iraq's pervasive ethnic and religious divisions evidence the need for governmental
structures that both ensure stability and facilitate power sharing. Though no official
census data exist outlining Iraq's exact ethnic or religious makeup, the CIA World Fact
Book estimates that Iraq is 32-37% Sunni Muslim, 60-65% Shi'a Muslim, and 3% other
religions, including Christians.n Ethnically, Iraq is 75-80% Arab, 14-20% Kurdish, and
5% Turkoman, Assyrian and other groups. 12 (See Appendix 3).
Within Iraq, Sunni and Shi'a13 have historically opposed each other about the
distribution of power. That concern, coupled with opposing views about issues like the
11 CIA. "Iraq." The World Factbook (2007) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbooklgeos/iz.html.
12 CIA. "Iraq." The World Factbook (2007) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbooklgeos/iz.html.
13 Sunni and Shi'a are different sects ofIslam. Worldwide, Sunnis are the largest group of Muslims, but
Shi'a are a majority in Iraq and Iran, among other countries. The religious distinction between Sunni and
Shi'a Muslims is based on the differing beliefs who the Caliph, or leader, ofIslam should have been after
the Prophet Muhammed died.
..... -
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role of U.S. and other foreign actors, Iraqi autonomy, and de-Baathification14 has
prompted violence between Shi'a militias and Sunni insurgencies. Given the political
salience of these ethnic groups, a majoritarian democracy (with a structure similar to the
United States) would not likely be a good fit because majority votes could result in the
permanent exclusion of minority populations from the government and would not address
the violence stemming from Iraqi ethnic and religious divisions. As such, it is essential
that a democratic Iraq provide meaningful ways for members of different ethnic and
religious groups to participate in the government in order to reduce ethnic tensions.
VI. SCHOLARLY AND MILITARY PREFERENCE FOR CONSOCIATIONALISM
To manage these religious and ethnic tensions, scholars have advocated the
implementation of consociationalism in Iraq. Consociationalism's provisions for power-
sharing structures would allow Sunni and Shi'a populations to share power in the new
Iraqi government and would enable both sects to participate in decision-making.
Theoretically, such inclusion would ensure that participating minority and majority
groups feel fairly represented and realize that they can best advocate their community's
interests by participating in the government. As Ari Ozdogan wrote in his 2005 support
of consociationalism in Iraq, "consociational democracy maximizes the equal opportunity
among the different groups in terms ofpolitical power and socioeconomic conditions.,,15
Such participation and opportunity promotes stability because the belief that a
community can best resolve conflicts through the governmental process results in an
increased probability of reliance on peaceful means and government institutions to
14 De-Baathification refers to U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority's decision to ban members of the
Iraqi Baath Party (of which Saddam Hussein was a member) from participation in the new government.
15Ari Ozdogan, "Democracy for the New Iraq," Journal ofTurkish Weekly, 16 May 2005.
---
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address problems. Though they question the feasibility of such a model, in 2003 Daniel
BYman and Kenneth Pollack acknowledged the scholarly appeal of consociationalism.
They wrote that "one of the most commonly suggested forms for a post-Saddam Iraqi
government would be... a consociational oligarchy,,16 In light of the militias and
insurgencies dividing Iraq's religious communities, policies promoting peaceful conflict
resolution and utilization of the government would be beneficial. This trend of scholarly
preference for consociationalism in Iraq is further evident in the Institute of World
Affairs' roundtable report, which concluded that "an adapted consociational model would
be a good starting point in Iraq.,,17 Despite hesitations about the specific adaptations
necessary in order for consociationalism to succeed in Iraq, much scholarly work exists
demonstrating a clear preference for some version of Lijphart's model.
In addition to scholarly support and theoretical reasons advocating
consociationalism in Iraq, the United States strategy for rebuilding national infrastructure
also demonstrates a military preference for the tenets of consociationalism. This
preference stems from a belief that such a model would ensure Iraqi stability and
minimize Sunni-Shi'a conflict. As the U.S-u.K. coalition is heavily involved in the
rebuilding process, its strategy for a democratic Iraq is relevant.
Given the presence of diverse ethnic and religious groups and continued
polarization of the Shi'a and Sunni communities, the United States-led Coalition
Provisional Authority outlined a goal of ensuring unity and peaceful management of
16 Daniel L Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Democracy in Iraq?" The Washington Quarterly, Summer
2003: 119-136.
17 Institute of World Affairs, Investigating Democracy Roundtable Series, Consociational Democracy: The
Lebanese Experience & The Iraqi Endeavor, 10 Nov. 2006
http://www.iwa.orglPublications/Lectures/full%20roundtable%20report-
%20Consociational%20Democracy.pdf.
--
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ethnic and religious differences. While not explicitly advocating consociationalism in
Iraq, it certainly emphasizes the same goals. Specifically, the United States National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq outlines the goal of "creat[ing] space for compromise across
ethnic and religious divides and for the steady growth of national institutions.,,18 This
goal reflects consociationalism's principles of a grand coalition of governing elites and
proportionality, and further evidences political leaders' and political scientists' support
for a power-sharing arrangement in Iraq.
The contrast between the current situation in Iraq and the hope for
consociationalism as a means to manage conflict is surprising. In light of the support for
consociationalism from academics and invested stakeholders in addition to
consociationalism's historical successes, the instability in 2006 Iraq suggests that some
aspect of consociationalism did not work or was not tried. I will explore if
consociationalism was ever fully attempted in Iraq, and if so, what went wrong in its
implementation.
PART IV: CONSOCIATIONAL ATTEMPTS & FAILURE
VII. ANALYSIS OF IRAQI CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Examination of Iraq's constitutional provisions suggests that consociationalism,
as Lijphart envisioned it, was attempted. Based on an evaluation ofthe constitution's
provisions for a regional autonomy, a grand coalition government, mutual veto rights and
18 National Security Council. "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq." 2005
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/ira'l...strategy_nov2005 .html#part2.
------------------------- --- - - ---
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proportionality, it appears that the constitution did contain some consociational
provisions.
Specifically, the constitution did contain federal provisions aimed at providing
autonomy to Kurdish, Sunni and Shi'a communities.19 However, while this complies
with consociationalism's autonomy goals, it does so while alienating Sunnis, who
favored a decentralized Iraq instead of federal regions. While providing this degree of
self-sufficiency may have been ideal, opting for such federation given the Sunni's intense
opposition to it may have actually undermined consociationalism's chances for success. 20
Nevertheless, these efforts to accommodate the needs of both communities demonstrate
the constitution's inclusion of an important component of consociationalism. The
. constitution outlines that all powers not exclusively reserved for the federal government
"shall be the powers of the regions,',21 and also protects the rights of regions to oversee
regional educational institutions and security forces. Such delegation of governmental
power represents the commitment to regional autonomy that consociationalism requires
while paradoxically simultaneously intensifying tensions between religious sects.
The constitution also allows for a grand coalition of governing elites, in
accordance with Lijphart's criteria. Article 62 creates a Federation Council, a legislative
body that will "include representatives from the regions and the governorates that are not
organized in a region. A law, enacted by a two-third majority of the member of the
19 Nathan Brown, "The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary," Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (2005) http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/FinalDraftSeptI6.pdf.
20 Sunnis feared that federalism would lead to Iraq's dissolution and instead preferred decentralization,
which allowed for provincial autonomy but did not allow provinces to have individual constitutions and
border guards.
21 Iraq Constitution. United Nations. Retrieved January 15, 2007 from
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20704/11332732681 iraqi_constitution_en.pdfi'iraqi_constitution_en.pdf
....
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Council of Representatives, shall regulate the Federation Council formation.,,22 While the
specific regulations about membership and function this council were not explicitly
outlined in the constitution, this reflected a concrete attempt to create a coalition style
governing body. This Federation Council would be one of two legislative bodies (the
other is the Council of Representatives), and while it was clearly intended as a law-
making body, its authority is undefrned.23 The constitution's creation of the Federation
Council demonstrates a clear attempt to comply with consociationalism's doctrines.
Conversely, the Shi'a-dominated drafting committee's preference for
majoritarianism limited the constitution's consociational aspects because the majority's
views impinged upon the principle of mutual veto rights and did not require minority
consent in order to pass bills. Shi'a comprised a majority of the constitutional committee
and are a majority in Iraq, and as such, the constitution's provisions allowed for majority
rule to some extent. These majoritarian principles would clearly benefit the Shi'a
majority. This is evident in "a major feature in the new Constitution is the shift from
consociational to majoritarian rule,,,24 partially because the document replaced the
transitional government's Presidential Council (where the three members all had mutual
veto power) with "a ceremonial presidency with no powers.,,25 The previous three-
person Presidency allowed for Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish leaders to veto actions or laws
that they perceived as detrimental to their constituencies, but under the new constitution
22 Iraq Constitution. United Nations. Retrieved January 15, 2007 from
http://porta1.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20704/11332732681 iraqtconstitution_en.pdf/iraqi_constitution_en.pdf.
23 CIA. "Iraq." The World Factbook (2007) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbooklgeos/iz.html.
24 Faleh Jabar, The Constitution ofIraq: Religious and Ethnic Relations. London, Minority Rights Group
International, 2005. http://www.minorityrights.org/adminidownloadlpd£'IraqMicro2005.pdf.
25 Faleh Jabar, The Constitution ofIraq: Religious and Ethnic Relations. London, Minority Rights Group
International, 2005. http://www.minorityrights.org/adminldownloadlpdf/IraqMicro2005.pdf.
T
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this was no longer allowed. As such, Iraq's constitution does not meet Lijphart's criteria
for mutual veto rights.
Despite the majoritarian aspects of the ceremonial presidency, other aspects of
Iraq's constitution reflect Lijphart's principle ofproportionality. Specifically, the
constitutional provisions mandate "fair distribution of grants, aid, and international
loans,,26 and the establishment of a public commission composed of federal regions,
governorates and parts of Iraq not established in a region27, but do not outline how these
goals will be accomplished. Given Sunni opposition to, and Kurdish preference for, a
federalized Iraq, this lack of clarity could result in the implementation of laws that would
alienate either community. While consensus on this issue would have been difficult to
reach in the hasty drafting process, a clear understanding of the nature of this
proportionality and the role of federal regions could have prevented future conflict.
Furthermore, it could have allowed for all parties, instead ofjust those in power at the
time ofthe provision's implementation to guide the law's direction.
However, despite the lack of clarity for sothe of the laws outlining proportionality,
other aspects of the Iraqi constitution produced a system of proportional representation.
Though the constitution "gives little guidance on how an election law should be
written,,,28 the resulting electoral laws were proportional. Currently, the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) oversees elections. The IECI describes the Iraqi
electoral process as "mainly a governorate based system [where] 230 seats are appointed
26 Iraq Constitution. United Nations. Retrieved January 15,2007 from
http://portal.unesco.orglci/en/files/20704/11332732681 iraqi_constitution_en.pdf/iraqi_constitution_en.pdf.
27 Iraq Constitution. United Nations. Retrieved January 15,2007 from
http;//portal.unesco.orglci/en/files/20704/11332732681iraqi_constitution_en.pdf/iraqi_constitution_en.pdf.
28 Nathan Brown. "The Final Draft ofthe Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary." Carnegie
Endowment/or International Peace, (2005),
http://www.camegieendowment.orgifiles/FinalDraftSept16.pdf.
....-~------------------------_._ .._-- ,..
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among the 18 governorates in proportion to the number of persons registered to vote. ,,29
(See Appendix 1) The IECI asserts that this process is "part of a larger family of
proportional representation,,30 systems which establish that the IECl's laws mirror those
of other countries with Proportional Representation. This directly corresponds with
Lijphart's principle ofproportionality. Such a system prioritizes representation ofthe
diverse communities of a nation. Additionally, the IECI reserves 45 seats to allocate to
non-elected representatives. Some of these seats will go to political parties that do not
gain any seats but still earn at least 1/275 (the established threshold) ofthe total votes cast
in the national election. The IECI allocates other seats to reward parties that won a
majority of votes both in governorates and nationwide. This election law and its outlined
plan for proportional representation complies with consociational principles, and
demonstrates an additional way in which Iraq attempted consociationalism. Though the
electoral system was not explicitly outlined in the constitution, the resulting legislation
was proportional.
As such, the constitution complied with Lijphart's criteria for consociational
governments through its emphasis on regional autonomy and a grand coalition of
governing elites. Though lacking in provisions protecting minority veto rights, Iraq's
constitution prioritizes Lijphart's principles of consociational governments through
articles that resulted in proportional representation electoral laws and proportional
distribution ofgovernment resources. While minority veto rights could be strengthened,
Iraq's constitution mostly complies with the framework of Lijphart's consociational
29 Independent Electoral Commission ofIraq. FAQs and Factsheets: 15 December Electoral System.
http://www.ieciraq.orglEnglish/Frameset_english.htm.
30 Independent Electoral Commission ofIraq. FAQs and Factsheets: 15 December Electoral System.
http://www.ieciraq.orglEnglish/Frameset_english.htm.
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theory. Given Iraq's consociational constitution, by Lijphart's logic it should have
resulted in peaceful power-sharing and diminished ethnic tensions.
VIII. IRAQ IN 2006: CONSOCIATIONALISM Is UNSUCCESSFUL
Despite attempts at consociationalism, in December 2006 nearly 1.6 million
people had been displaced in Iraq and 1.8 million had fled the country, largely due to the
pervasive sectarian violence.31 As such, while consociationalism could have helped to
prevent the complete dissolution of Iraq, the high levels of ethnic conflict and violence
evidence that consociationalism did not meet its goal of stability. As of the publication of
the Baker-Hamilton Commission's Iraq Study Group Report, "violence [in Iraq] is
increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality [from] Sunni Arab insurgency, al Qaeda
and affiliatedjihadist groups, Shi'a militias and death squads, and organized
criminality.,,32 The Baker-Hamilton Commission further noted that "sectarian violence
has become the principal challenge to stability.,,33 This increasing violence is
predominantly focused between Sunni and Shi'a religious sects and has compromised
any attempt at Iraqi stability. The 2006 chaos is exactly the type of situation that
consociational governments hope to prevent.
In addition to sectarian violence and instability, Iraq's government has not
adhered to consociationalism's power-sharing tenets and the principle of inter-ethnic elite
cooperation. Despite the constitution's creation of consociational government institutions,
''the composition ofthe Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and key players within
31 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Approach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 4.
32 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Approach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 3.
33 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Approach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 3.
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the government too often act in their sectarian interest' .34 As such, the consociational
attempts did not prevent ethnocentric governmental officials from non-cooperation with
other religious groups. Though Iraqi leaders have demonstrated some willingness to heed
the needs of minority groups by agreeing to consider the necessity of constitutional
amendments, these prevailing sectarian interests have prevented policies addressing
Sunni concerns. Additionally, because "Iraqi leaders view issues through a sectarian
prism,,,35 efforts at cross-community compromise have been limited and unsuccessful at
quelling increasing insurgent and militia violence. Such "sectarian prisms" result in a
polarized Iraq and governing elite who are primarily concerned with their ethnic or
religious group, rather than with national concerns. Analysis of Iraq in 2006, specifically
with respect to violence and the polarized political elite, reveals that consociationalism
had not been successfully implemented.
Given the previous analysis of the Iraqi constitution's consociationalism provision,
and the wide respect for consociational theorizing among political scientists and policy-
makers, this failure is surprising. Since the governing institutions theoretically aligned
with consociational principles, this failure prompts further exploration. This failure may
have resulted from inherent flaws in Lijphart's model, or could mean that Iraq may not
have been suited for consociationalism in light of the favorable factors. Additionally, this
failure could have resulted from a flawed implementation process.
34 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Approach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 15.
35 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Approach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 15.
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PART V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
IX. DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION
Examination of the role of the constitution drafting process reveals that Sunnis'
perceived exclusion hindered consociationalism's implementation. In a 2005 referendum,
most Iraqi citizens approved a national constitution aimed at establishing a democratic
regime. While many hailed the approval of the constitution as a positive step toward
national reconciliation and peace, the drafting process itself may have significantly
contributed to the failure of cross-community compromise and consociationalism. The
contentious process of drafting the constitution divided Iraqis along religious lines.
Sunnis criticized the constitution based on claims of exclusion from meaningful
participation in the decision-making process. In July 2005, 15 Sunni Arabs joined the
constitutional drafting committee, and their dissent from Shi' a and Kurdish viewpoints
impeded decision making. One Sunni Arab member, Mijbel Sheikh Issa, reported in an
interview (one half hour before his assassination):
Kurdish and Shiite brothers are trying to impose their notion of federalism
without consulting us. They have already made their decision. We Sunnis
joined the committee very late. They thought they had chosen the Sunnis who
would not discuss matters with them. They thought that we would come and sign
the papers.36
Issa's sentiments demonstrate the Sunni alienation from the constitutional process. This
alienation is especially detrimental to the possibility of a consociational government
because it reduces the Sunni's loyalty to a national government. Such loyalty and faith
that the government can resolve conflict is essential to preventing violent attempts to
36 International Crisis Group, Policy Briefmg: "Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry." 26
Sept. 2005.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east_north_africa/ira~iran~ulf/b19_unmaking_i
ra~a_constitutionatprocess_gone_awry.pdf.
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redress wrongs, as is seen in militia and insurgent groups. Because "the extent to which
the Committee was able to operate as a forum for the expression of Sunni Arab
constitutional positions...was marginal at best,,3? it is unlikely that the Sunnis would have
much faith in the constitution's provisions or the ensuing government, thus increasing the
likelihood that sectarian groups will use violence to address community concerns.
Additionally, this alienation reveals the inability of Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish delegates to
work together, which could have further impeded the successful implementation of
consociationalism by fragmenting Iraq's political elite.
In addition to communication problems and allegations of exclusion during the
constitutional drafting process, discussion of some of the constitution's provisions also
exacerbated ethnic differences and conflict. Specifically, as Issa mentioned above,
Sunnis opposed the Shi'a and Kurdish attempts to create a federal Iraq because of
concerns that federalism would ultimately lead to the disintegration of the nation.38
Nevertheless, the constitution outlines a federal structure for Iraq with geographically-
based governorates. Furthermore, the constitution's references to De-Ba'athification39
caused Sunnis to protest that "this blanket ban [of Ba'ath party members] could be used
to arbitrarily lustrate or otherwise punish them, with De-Ba'athification turning into 'de-
Sunnification",4o because the Ba'ath party was primarily Sunni. This exclusion of Sunni
37Jonathan Morrow, United States Institute ofPeace, "Iraq's Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity
Lost." November 2005, http://www.usip.orglpubs/specialreports/sr155.pdf. p 9.
38 International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing: "Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry." 26
September 2005.
http://www.crisisgroup.orgllibrary/documents/middle_east_north_africa/iraCLiran_gulflb19_unmaking_i
raCLa_constitutional-IJrocess_gone_awry.pdf.
39 De-Ba'athification refers to the exclusion of many members of the Iraqi Ba'ath party from participation
in the new Iraqi political process. Saddam Hussein, a Slfnni, was a member of the Ba'ath Party.
40 International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing: "Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry."
http://www.crisisgroup.orgllibrary/documents/middle_east_north_africa/iraCLiran~ulf/b19_unmaking_i
raCLa_constitutional-IJrocess_gone_awry.pdf.
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leaders angered the Sunni community. These disagreements about the constitution's
content, in conjunction with perceived attempts to exclude the Sunni representatives
intensified inter-group tensions, and thereby decreased the possibility of reaching a
consociational compromise. As a result, the drafting process decreased the likelihood of
Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds sharing power peacefully.
In an effort to meet the Transitional National Authority's deadlines for
constitutional drafting and ratification, the process was hasty and neglected to properly
invest and include the Sunni population. Such exclusion was evident when "on 28
August [2005], the leadership of the Shi'a and Kurdish communities decided that an
agreement with Sunni Arabs could not be reached and presented the draft to the TNA as
final over the latter's angry objections.,,41 This decision to move forward without
consideration of the complaints of the Sunni representatives on the constitutional
committee demonstrates an overall unwillingness to work with different communities.
Such actions made Sunni resentment legitimate not only of the resulting constitution, but
also of those parties involved in its drafting. Because of this exclusion, the International
Crisis Group believes that "clearly, the constitutional process has further entrenched
ethnic-sectarian identities in ways that bode ill for the country's future.,,42 Through this
controversy of ethnic divisions, constitutional provisions lack needed legitimacy from
Sunnis. Additionally, the process undermined any efforts to ameliorate tensions between
41 International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing: "Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry."
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east_north_africa/ira.Liran~ulfi.b19_unmaking_i
ra'La_constitutionalyrocess_gone_awry.pdf. .
42 International Crisis Group, Policy Briefmg: "Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry."
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east_north_africa/ira.Liran_gulfi.b19_unmaking_i
ra'La_constitutionalyrocess_gone_awry.pdf.
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Sunni and Shi'a because of the Sunni's perceived inability to meaningfully participate in
the discussion.
Examination of this process in light of Lijphart' s favorable factors for
consociationalism reveals that the constitutional drafting decreased the likelihood of
successfully implementing power sharing. Specifically, Ujphart names a history of
accommodating behavior amongst the political elite as an important, albeit not required,
factor in the development of a consociational democracy. Consociational theorist
Matthijs Bogaards agrees, writing that "a tradition of elite accommodation, intensive
communication democracy between elites and the absence of a majority group...are
equally helpful in maintaining consociational democracy.,,43 Such accommodation is
important because in a consociational arrangement, the political elite, or leaders, must
acknowledge that power-sharing may require compromise, and at minimum, willingness
to work with leaders from different ethnic groups. The inability of Sunni and Shi'a elite
to collaborate throughout the drafting process marks an important example of elite non-
cooperation that undennined Lijphart's goal of elite accommodation.
Furthennore, vague constitutional provisions impeded clear constitutional
provisions and may have contributed to the difficulty of maintaining a stable and peaceful
Iraq. Scholarly criticism of Iraq's constitution emphasizes this ambiguity as contributing
to ethnic conflict. The International Crisis Group agrees, claiming that:
Key passages, such as those dealing with decentralization and with the
responsibility for taxation, are both vague and ambiguous and so carry the seeds
of future discord. Many vital areas are left for future legislation that will have
less standing than the constitution be more vulnerable to amendment and bear the
43 Matthijs Bogaards, "The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review," European
Journal ofPolitical Research 33.4 (1998) 475-496.
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sectarian imErint of the Shiite community given its likely dominance of future
legislatures. 4
Such concern is valid, especially given the lack of meaningful Sunni input to the
constitutional drafting committee. As a result of imprecise wording and vague
implementation plans, interpretation of the practical application of constitutional
provisions will be left to a legislature, likely comprised of the Shi'a majority. In effect, .
this increases Shi'a power because their majority position in the legislature will give
them the power to interpret and apply the constitution. Shi'a's majority, combined with
Sunni's limited role in the drafting process, contributed to inter-ethnic tensions and
further eroded the possibility of amicable power-sharing. The drafting process, disputed
provisions about federalism, and constitutional vagueness all contributed to Sunni-Shi'a
tensions and reduced the likelihood of elite accommodation and that different sects would
peacefully share power in the legislature. As such, the constitutional drafting process
greatly hindered the ability of consociationalism to succeed in Iraq.
X. CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM
In addition to the problems of constitutional drafting, the constitutional approval
process also intensified inter-ethnic relations in Iraq. This process further enhanced
tensions and decreased the likelihood of power-sharing and successful consociationalism.
The October 15,2005 vote to ratify the constitution draft required approval from voters-
had two-thirds of voters in three or more of Iraq's 18 governorates opposed the
constitution, it would not have passed.45 The draft passed with the approval of nearly
44 International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing: "Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry."
http://www.crisisgroup.orgllibrary/documents/middle_east_north_africaliraCLiran~ulflb 19_unmaking_i
raCLa_constitutional-process_gone_awry.pdf.
45"Iraqi Constitution Approved by 79 Percent of Voters," Bloomberg, 25 Oct. 2005
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=l0000087&sid=amqz7dZlEx3w&refer=top_world_news.
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79%46 of Iraqis who voted. However, the Sunni minority opposed the constitution and
expressed concerns about the drafting process and about several key provisions like
federalism. Two Sunni governorates, Anbar and Salahaddin voted to reject the
constitution by 96.96% and 81.75%47, respectively. In Ninevah and Diyala, (also
predominately Sunni), 55.01% and 48.73%48, respectively, voted against the constitution.
Though opponents failed to muster the needed two-thirds of no votes in three
governorates, "it is clear that Sunni Arabs in Iraq generally voted against the
constitution.,,49 Whether angered over the drafting procedure or over the substance of the
constitution, Sunni Arabs overwhelmingly opposed the constitution's adoption, and it
was nevertheless adopted.
The adoption of the constitution despite Sunni opposition exemplifies that despite
consociational provisions in the document, the process subverted the spirit of power-
sharing. Since Sunnis did not support the constitution or feel adequately represented in
the drafting process, they will be less likely to feel the sense of national unity and view
the government as legitimate. Additionally, since Sunnis were unable to block the
adoption of the constitution even with overwhelming opposition, they may lose faith that
the government can be a useful model to resolve problems and that they can participate
meaningfully in government. Consociationalism prioritizes mutual veto rights as a way
in which groups can all be heard in government. While mutual veto traditionally refers to
a community's ability to block unfavorable legislation, extension of this principle should
46"Iraqi Constitution Approved by 79 Percent of Voters," Bloomberg, 25 Oct. 2005
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=amqz7dZlEx3w&refer=top_world_news.
47 Jonathan Morrow, "Iraq's Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost," The United States Institute of
Peace, 2005 http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr155.pdf.
48 Jonathan Morrow, "Iraq's Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost," The United States Institute of
Peace, 2005 http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr155.pdf.
49 Jonathan Morrow, "Iraq's Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost," The United States Institute of
Peace, 2005 http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr155.pdf.
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allow minorities to have some veto rights about structure of the government. As such,
this principle of mutual veto would mean that if one ethnic group overwhelmingly
opposes the constitution, it would not be adopted. However, as the constitution's passed
despite Sunni opposition, this did not happen in Iraq. As Shibley Telhami wrote after the
constitution's approval, "the irony of the Iraqi Constitution, which passed with 79 percent
of the vote, is that. .. from the point of view of limiting sectarian conflict, it would have
probably been better had the document been defeated."so Defeat of the constitution,
while seemingly a rejection of consociational principles, would have increased the
likelihood of eventually creating a governmental model acceptable to all parties. It would
have heeded the intent of mutual veto and consociational principles not only in the
constitution but also in the process - and showed power in decisions about government
structure. Furthermore, had the constitution been defeated, "Sunnis...would have gained
more faith in the process"Sl because their concerns would have been heeded as legitimate.
Since this did not happen, the adoption of the constitution occurred down ethnic lines,
and intensified concern that the new government would not include the interests of all
ethnic groups. Consequently, although the constitution's content primarily followed
consociational principles, its adoption went against the underlying themes of power-
sharing, consensus-building, and mutual veto that characterize consociational
governments.
The constitutional process in Iraq simultaneously affirmed consociational
principles through the content of the constitution and undermined power-sharing through
50 Shibley Telhami, "Rush to Stabilize May BackfIre in Polarized Iraq," The Brookings Institution, 2005.
http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/fellows/telhami20051030.htm.
51 Shibley Telhami, "Rush to Stabilize May BackfIre in Polarized Iraq," The Brookings Institution, 2005.
http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/fellows/telhami20051030.htm.
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the drafting and ratification process. The constitution's content allowed for regional
autonomy and resulted in proportional election law and allocation of resources mostly in
accordance with Lijphart's framework for a consociational democracy. Consequently,
with regard to the content of the constitution, Iraq did attempt to create a consociational
democracy. However, through the Sunni objections about exclusion from the drafting
process, and the constitution's ratification despite Sunni votes against it, the process was
not inclusive and betrayed the power-sharing principles of elite cooperation and mutual
veto. As such, the constitutional process and its departure from the spirit for
consociational power-sharing demonstrate an important factor in the current instability of
Iraq and the failure of consociationalism.
PART VI. IRAQ AND LIJPHART'S FAVORABLE
FACTORS
XI. WAS IRAQ A GOOD FIT FOR CONSOCIATIONALISM?
Though the process of implementing consociationalism alienated political elite in
Iraq and thereby hindered its success, Lijphart claims that any country can successfully
adopt a consociational government. Despite his assertion, Lijphart also outlines qualities
that he believes better facilitate the model's implementation. These factors are "not
derived deductively from consociational theory but inductively from the experience in
consociational democracies,,52 and demonstrate trends about the qualities of countries that
successfully have implemented the consociationalism. Since consociationalism hinges
upon the cooperation of political elite, Matthijs Bogaards and Van Schendelen argue that
"the real test for favorable factors ... [is that] 'it should be possible to predict, on the basis
52 Matthijs Bogaards, "The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review," European
Journal ofPolitical Research 33.4 (1998) 475-496.
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of the presence or absence of the conditions, the chances of elite-cooperation occurring in
a plural society' .,,53 As such, most ofthe factors conducive to consociationalism could
also be considered factors that accompany or induce elite cooperation. Likewise, external
actions that facilitate elite cooperation should also be deemed favorable to
consociationalism's success. Although he has outlined many criteria, Lijphart found that
the most consistent factors were that successful societies had "segmental isolation
(geographic or otherwise), external threats, a balance of power between the segments of
no majority segment and segments of equal size, and a small country/population size.,,54
In addition to Lijphart's theory, I will also consider Brendan O'Leary and John
McGarry's theory, based on their experience with Northern Ireland's Good Friday
Agreement, which argues that benevolent foreign actors can help facilitate a
consociational arrangement. Examination of Iraq's compliance with these factors will
reveal whether scholarly support for Iraqi consociationalism was legitimized by
Lijphart's criteria.
Theoretically, segmental isolation should prove beneficial to consociationalism's
implementation because separation of different groups likely would reduce opportunities
for inter-group friction and violent conflict. However, this should not be interpreted as an
endorsement of segregation: instead, Lijphart sees self-imposed separation as favorable to
consociationalism but also as something that should not be forcibly imposed. In 2006
Iraq, the Kurds are geographically separated in the northern Kurdistan region. Sunni and
Shi'a communities were fairly separated in most provinces, in part because "'ethnic
53 Matthijs Bogaards, "The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review," European
Journal ofPolitical Research 33.4 (1998) 475-496.
5~atthijs Bogaards, "The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review," European
Journal ofPolitical Research 33.4 (1998) 475-496.
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cleansing' has resulted in population shifts that have left Iraq increasingly divided on
sectarian grounds,,,55 but this was not always the case and many Shi'a and Sunni live in
the same areas. (See Appendix 3) However, especially in the Baghdad, Diyala and Al-
Anbar Governorates, there are sizeable Shi'a and Sunni populations.56 Though Kurds
primarily live in a separate Kurdistan region, and simultaneously fairly peaceful and
stable compared to the rest of the country, Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a populations are not
separate. Consequently, Iraq did not meet Lijphart's favorable condition of separated
ethnic groups.
Lijphart also noted that external threats contributed to successful consociational
democracies, presumably because such threats would unite disparate groups and build a
sense of nationalism. However, as Bogaards notes, "external threats have a unifying
effect only when they are perceived as a common danger by all segments.,,57 Therefore,
should a external threat be perceived differently between different ethnic or religious
groups, this would not unify groups and may exacerbate inter-group tensions. Given the
international presence in Iraq, perception of external actors is especially relevant. A 2004
Gallup poll reveals that Iraqis are divided about the presence of foreign troops: 33% of
Iraqis "say the coalition invasion ofIraq has 'done more good than harro",58 while 46%
believe "the invasion has 'done more harm than good' .,,59 These statistics reveal that in
2004, Iraqis did not overwhelmingly view the U.S. and Britain-led invasion similarly.
55 Ewen MacAskill, "Latest US Solution to Iraq's Civil War: A Three-Mile Wall," The Guardian, 21
April 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2062426,00.html.
56 "Iraq: Ethnoreligious Groups." Iraq Map a Folio, CIA. Accessed via University of Texas Library.
http://www.1ib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/ira'Lethnoreligious_I992.jpg. 1992.
57 Matthijs Bogaards, "The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review," European
Journal ofPolitical Research 33.4 (1998) 475-496.
58 Richard Burkholder., "Gallup Poll ofIraq: Liberated, Occupied, or in Limbo?" The Gallup Organization
2004. http://www.thepop.org/pdfs/gptb_I.pdf.
59 Richard Burkholder. "Gallup Poll ofIraq:Liberated, Occupied, or in Limbo?" The Gallup Organization
2004. http://www.thepop.org/pdfs/gptb_1.pdf.
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These different perspectives about the U.S and Britain-led invasion are even more
evident between Shi'a and Sunni Iraqis, as evidenced in Gallup poll data from 2004:
Thlnklng.bout.ny .hIJnlsblpB you might have sufffJnJdsine. the U.s...B1ttRin
IIJVllSioJI. do jICH1 PlJISolJfJfly think thafousting hddlltn Hussein was worlh·/t
fJl'lJotfl .
60
Given Shi'a and Sunni's obvious differences in opinion, these communities could not
unite around a shared perception of an external threat. Once again, Iraq does not comply
with one of Lijphart's favorable factors.
Additionally, Lijphart claims that societies with a balance of power between
segments or without a majority segment are more likely to effectively implement
consociational models. Study ofIraq's demographics, especially the 32-37% Sunni
population compared to the 60-65% Shi'a population, demonstrates that this is clearly not
the case.61 The Shi'a outnumber Sunnis nearly by a factor of two, establishing a clear
majority. Furthermore, the Sunnis' historical domination in Iraqi politics, despite their
minority status, has created an imbalance of power. Shi'a resentment of Sunnis stemmed
in part because of Saddam Hussein's rule, when "more than 300,000 Shi'ites were
killed,,,62 and minority Sunnis were in power. As such, there is a consistent struggle for
power in Iraq between the Shi'a and Sunni population. Consequently, Iraq's clear Shi'a
60 Richard Burkholder. "Gallup Poll of Iraq: Liberated, Occupied, or in Limbo?" The Gallup Organization
http://www.thepop.orglpdfs/gptb_I.pdf.
61CIA. "Iraq." The World Factbook (2007) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/iz.html.
62 Bobby Gosh, "Beyond the Sunni-Shi'ite Divide," Time Magazine 22 Feb. 2007.
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majority after a tradition of Sunni domination dispels the possibility of a balance of
power or historical trend of power-sharing.
Iraq also does not meet Lijphart's last condition for successful implementation of
consociationalism, small country or population size. Lijphart believes that small are
more conducive to consociationalism because the "elites are more likely to know each
other personally and to meet more often.,,63 These interactions would theoretically
promote elite cooperation. With 27,499,638 people,64 Iraq is clearly not a small country.
With such a large population and regional governorates, Iraq provides little opportunity
for integration and constructive interactions between political elite of different
communities.
In addition to Lijphart's criteria, Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry also outline
an additional criterion that they believe fosters successful consociationalism. Based on
the factors that helped to facilitate the creation of the Northern Ireland power sharing
agreement, O'Leary and McGarry emphasize the importance of external forces. They
believe that, with the exception of the commonly perceived external threats, Lijphart's
factors overly emphasize internal forces within a country. They claim that in addition to
external threats, Lijphart should have considered that "outside forces can facilitate
consociation by benign rather than malign intervention.,,65 Based on Northern Ireland's
experience in the creation ofthe consociational Good Friday Agreement, O'Leary and
McGarry argue that the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland contributed to the
63 Matthijs Bogaards, "The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review," European
Journal ofPolitical Research 33.4 (1998) 475-496.
64 CIA. "Iraq." The World Factbook (2007) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/iz.html.
65 John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary. "Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its
Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland," Government & Opposition,
41 (2006) 43-63.
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peaceful agreement by providing external support to polarized communities (Irish
nationalists and those supporting re-unification with the United Kingdom). Although
Lijphart's "traditional consociational theory neglected a benign or at least activist role for
outsiders in the promotion ofpower-sharing,,,66 the success67 ofNorthern Ireland's
consociational model and ability to gamer cross-community support suggests that such a
role may be important and could have benefited Iraq. As such, it is relevant to consider
the presence of benign external actors when evaluating the favorable factors for
consociationalism in Iraq.
The lack of benign foreign actors involved in the creation of a consociational
government in Iraq hurt its chances for success. As discussed previously, Sunni and
Shi'a varied greatly in their opinions about the United States and United Kingdom's
presence in Iraq. According to a 2004 Gallup poll, 71 %68 of Iraqis viewed the coalition
forces as occupiers rather than liberators, and therefore the Iraqis clearly do not see the
United States and United Kingdom coalition as benign actors. Though these countries
and the Coalition Provisional Authority were the most active international influences in
Iraq's constitutional drafting, they did not qualify as benign external actors. McGarry and
O'Leary's condition of benign external actors was absent.
66 John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary. "Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its
Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland," Government &
Opposition, 41 (2006) 43-63.
67 While the Good Friday Agreement did not succeed in peacefully uniting Ireland for very long, it can be
considered a partially successful consociational model because in the model, as O'Leary and McGarry
write, "eight Northern Irish political parties were able, largely voluntary, to agree on a settlement with
important consociational components, and to win endorsement for that agreement in simultaneous
referendums in both parts ofIreland". As such, it demonstrates the ability to unite a society around
consociational power-sharing principles that were acceptable to all parties, and serves as a good model
despite problems in implementation John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary. "Consociational Theory,
Northem Ireland's Conflict, and its Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern
Ireland," Government & Opposition, 41 (2006) 43-63.).
68 Richard Burkholder, "Gallup Poll of Iraq: Liberated, Occupied, or in Limbo?" The Gallup Organization
2004. http://www.thepop.org/pdfs/gptb_l.pdf.
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Given the sectarian nature of the Sunni-Shi'a dispute in Iraq, foreign actors
sympathetic to both parties could have played a vital role in reconciliation and the
establishment of power-sharing. In Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and the
United Kingdom helped to validate the concerns of nationalists seeking to be part of the
Republic of Ireland and unionists who supported British rule, respectively. Likewise,
external Shi'a and Sunni actors may have been able to bridge some sectarian divisions in
Iraq and support the creation of a consociational government. Despite concerns about the
stability ofIran and Syria, they are powerful Shi'a and Sunni countries, respectively, with
a vested interest in "avoiding the horrific consequences that would flow from a chaotic
Iraq, particularly a humanitarian catastrophe and regional destabilization.,,69 The Iraq
Study Group, though focused on evaluating the Iraqi conflict after the constitution was
passed, emphasized the importance of regional Sunni and Shia actors participating in
Iraq's rebuilding process. Urging involvement from nearby states like Syria and Sunni,
the report claimed that "Iraq's leaders may not be able to come together unless they
receive the necessary signals and support from abroad.,,70 This echoes O'Leary and
McGarry's argument and suggests international support, especially from nearby nations
like Syria or Iran, could have been helpful in negotiating constitutional terms and
ensuring support from and inclusion of both Sunni and Shi'a communities. Support
from Sunni and Shi' a leaders in Syria and Iran would have been better able to facilitate
inter-group elite cooperation than other foreign actors like the United Kingdom or United
69 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Approach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 32.
70 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Approach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 33.
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States. Especially in light ofIranian support for "various Shi'a militias in Iraq,,71 and
Syrian support for "Iraqi insurgent groups,',72 attempts to constructively include these
actors could have limited their support for violent groups and Iraqi's belief in the need for
these organizations as a mean to resolve problems. Iran and Syria's disconnect from the
process ofrebuilding Iraq has does not comply with O'Leary and McGarry's favorable
condition about the positive role that benign external actors can have in facilitating
power-sharing arrangements. In accordance with O'Leary and McGarry, this reduces the
chances for successful consociationalism and could partially explain its failure in Iraq.
Despite scholarly preference for consociationalism, examination of Lijphart' s
favorable conditions for the models' successful implementation reveals that Iraq does not
meet any of the four criteria or O'Leary and McGarry's preference for helpful external
actors. Although Lijphart claims that consociationalism could be successfully
implemented in any country if adopted with culture and country specific variations. Iraq's
failure to meet any of the four primary favorable factors suggests that such faith in Iraqi
consociationalism may have been overly optimistic. Therefore, in addition to a flawed
constitutional process, Iraqi also did not meet the favorable factors for consociationalism,
which made its implementation much more difficult. While this does not mean that
consociationalism should not have been attempted in Iraq, it merely means that additional
efforts to facilitate elite cooperation are needed. When considered in conjunction with
the creation of the Iraqi constitution, this clearly did not occur.
71 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Approach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 35.
72 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Approach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 35.
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The contentious constitutional drafting, content, and ratification process, in
addition to the absence of favorable factors for consociationalism in Iraq, hindered its
implementation and may have prompted increases in sectarian violence. However, other
factors, such as consociationalism's flaws, could also be especially relevant in Iraq and
could have further prevented peaceful resolution to sectarian conflict and power-sharing.
XII. CONSOCIATIONALISM' S CRITICISMS EXAMINED IN LIGHT OF Sm'A AND SUNNI
POLITICAL ELITE
Though Iraq's noncompliance with consociationalism's favorable factors and the
flawed constitutional drafting process largely explain power-sharing's failure, inherent
flaws in Lijphart's model could have also yielded Iraq's 2006 instability. Evaluation of
consociationalism's criticisms reveals that in addition to procedural problems
implementing the model, Iraq's leadership exacerbated consociationalism's flaws.
Critics ofconsociationalism claim that the model lacks sufficient motivation for political
compromise and is therefore unrealistic in a divided society. Political science theorist
Donald Horowitz believes that "the consociational approach is motivationally
inadequate,,73 because it assumes that political leaders, even those in the majority, will
cede power to the minority in the interest of national unity. He argues that
consociationalism requires an enlightened political elite who will willingly sacrifice the
ability to rille as a majority in order to share power, and that this is unrealistic. In
countries without a majority group, forming a multi-party coalition of elected officials in
order to create a legislative majority can be a sufficient incentive to share power. For
73 Donald Horowitz, "Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes," Prepared for delivery at the
Kellogg Institute Conference, Constitutional Design 2000: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and
Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century, (South Bend: University ofNotre Dame, 1999).
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countries like Iraq, however, where Shi'a outnumber Sunnis by nearly two to one, Shi'a
do not need the support of Sunnis in order to gain and maintain power. As such,
Horowitz would argue that there is insufficient motivation for Shi'a to share power with
Sunnis. Without leadership from all Iraqi sects committed to finding a peaceful solution
to sectarian conflict, Horowitz' criticism may be legitimate.
Unfortunately, Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a leaders have not expressed a desire to work
together to address sectarian conflict through a peaceful power-sharing arrangement and
their actions confirm that Horowitz' criticisms are relevant in Iraq. Despite purporting to
support a united Iraq, "key Shi'a and Kurdish leaders have little commitment to national
reconciliation.,,74 Examination of prominent leaders in the Sunni and Shi'a communities
supports this assertion, and further evidences Horowitz' criticism of consociationalism as
motivationally insufficient to foster elite cooperation.
Horowitz' criticism is especially evident in Shi'a leadership's unwillingness to
cooperate with Sunni political elite. For example, Shi'a leader Moqtada al-Sadr's
involvement with the violent Mahdi Army and distrust of Sunni Iraqis confirms
Horowitz' criticism of consociationalism's insufficient motivation for elite cooperation.
With an "almost cult-like following among Shi'a masses,,75 Moqtada al-Sadr's actions
shape Shi'a perceptions and behavior toward Sunni Iraqis. Furthermore, ai-Sadr was a
member of Maliki's government until his 2007 resignation, and therefore his
unwillingness to cooperate impacted the Iraqi government. AI-Sadr is a popular Shi'a
cleric and political elite with much power in Iraq. The Mahdi Army, a Shi'a militia
74 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Atroach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 19.
7 International Crisis Group, "Iraq's Muqtada AI-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabiliser?" Middle East Report 55
(2006). hrtp://www.crisisgroup.orglhome/index.cfm?id=4210.
we +
37
"widely believed to engage in regular violence against Sunni Arab civilians,,,76 and his
support for this violent sectarian organization evidences his inability to cooperate
peacefully with Sunni leaders. The Mahdi Anny and Sadr's "movement's involvement
in the dirty war that pits Sunnis against Shiites,,77 continually increased alongside
sectarian tensions, and was reportedly responsible for attacks on U.S. coalition forces and
for the deaths of more than 10,400 Iraqis in 2006.78 Through violent attacks, torture and
revenge killings, Sadr's Mahdi Anny has worsened Sunni-Shi'a tensions in Iraq and
perpetuated much of the current inter-ethnic violence. Indeed, Sadr's followers and
Mahdi militia members anonymously described their belief and goal that "the ta!ifiri/9,
the ones who kill, they should be killed... also the Saddamists. Whose hands are stained
with blood, they are sentenced to death,,,8o and this statement demonstrates their role in
sectarian violence. These sentiments reveal al-Sadr's followers' purposeful use of
militias to extract vengeance on Sunnis, and reveal the impact of al-Sadr's leadership on
the ability of Shi' a and Sunni Iraqis to coexist peacefully in Iraq.
Consociationalism and Lijphart's favorable factors emphasize the importance of
elite cooperation between different ethnic or religious sects. Sadr's Mahdi Anny and his
followers' goal of vengeance for Saddamists reveals that retribution, rather than stability
and peace, motivate many of his actions. In light of his populist support from Shia Iraqis,
76 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
Approach, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 11.
77 International Crisis Group, "Iraq's Muqtada Al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabiliser?" Middle East Report 55
(2006). http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=421 O.
78 Ellen Knickmeyer, "Sadr's Militia and the Slaughter in the Streets," The Washington Post, 25 Aug.
2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/24/AR200608240 1721.html.
79 "A term commonly employed by Shiites for violent Sunni extremists". Sadr's Militia and the Slaughter
in the Streets." The Washington Post. August 25,2006 .. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/24/AR2006082401721.html.
80 Ellen Knickmeyer, "Sadr's Militia and the Slaughter in the Streets," The Washington Post, 25 Aug 2006.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/24/AR200608240 1721.html.
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Sadr's support for an army engaged in sectarian violence suggests that he believes cross-
community compromise is not important and that his followers agree. This lack of
leadership did not help institute consociational power-sharing - it only intensified inter-
ethnic tensions both at the elite and at the popular levels. Sadr's lack of commitment to
inter-ethnic cooperation at both the elite and mass level supports Horowitz's criticism of
consociationalism. Additionally, Sadr's cooperation with and sponsorship of sectarian
violence contributed to the erosion of Iraq's consociational government by fragmenting
elite relationships and perpetuating ethnic tensions.
Like al-Sadr, Abdul Aziz aI-Hakim is also an influential Shi'a cleric and a
prominent Shi'a leader whose actions have alienated Sunnis, thereby justifying
Horowitz's criticism. Because of al-Hakim's position on the Iraqi Governing Council
and as the leader ofthe Supreme Council for Islamic Resolution in Iraq, a large Shi'a
organization, his preference for Shi'a and majoritarian policies are evident. Hakim's
preference for majoritarian politics at the exclusion of Sunni concerns is evident in his
unyielding support for the Iraqi Constitution. Given Sunni concerns about some of the
constitution's federalist provisions, "Sunni Arabs were promised they could propose
amendments to it during the first four months of the new Parliament."sl In spite of these
promises and sectarian concerns, Hakim, "the most influential politician in Iraq issued a
veiled warning to Sunni Arabs yesterday that the dominant Shi'a would not allow
substantive amendments to the country's constitution."s2 Hakim's insistence that the
constitutional provisions remain consistent despite Sunni concerns shows his
81 Bushra Juhi, '''Don't Meddle with Fledgling Constitution' Warning in Iraq," The Scotsman 12 Jan. 2006.
http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=53192006.
82 Bushra Juhi, '''Don't Meddle with Fledgling Constitution' Warning in Iraq," The Scotsman 12 Jan. 2006.
http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=53192006.
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commitment to majoritarian politics and contradicts the principles of consociationalism.
Iraqi regional analyst Kathleen Ridolfo criticizes this action as "contradict[ing] an
agreement Shi'ite and Kurdish leaders forged with Sunni Arabs" and claims that this
refusal to negotiate "threaten[s] recent attempts to bring Sunni Arab parties into a
national unity government.,,83 As Ridolfo explains, Hakim's refusal to negotiate further
alienates an already divided Sunni community by refusing to engage in dialogue about
their concerns. Additionally, Hakim stated in 2006 that although he wanted government
political coalitions to represent all Iraqis, "he stressed that any groups joining the
[governing] coalition would have to show commitment to a number of 'constants' in the
new constitution, such as federalism, de-Ba'athification and measures against the
insurgency.,,84 As discussed previously, Sunni opposition to the Iraq constitution
primarily focused on de-Ba'athification and federalism, and Hakim's refusal to support
discussion about these provisions limits Sunnis' ability to participate in the government.
Furthermore, it demonstrates his lack of support for meaningful power-sharing
institutions. This reluctance directly evidences Horowitz's critique about
consociationalism's inability to unite political elite from different communities.
Hakim's beliefs demonstrate that he believes that the majority-approved constitution
should not be subject to concerns of minority groups, and this majoritarian perspective
fundamentally conflicts with Lijphart's principle ofminority veto rights. As with
Moqtada al-Sadr, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's refusal to address Sunni concerns and
acknowledge minority perspectives corroborates Horowitz's concerns about elite
83 Kathleen Ridolfo, "Iraq: Shi'ite Leader Says No Negotiations on Core Constitutional Principles,"
RadioFreeEurope, 13 Jan. 2006. http://www.rferl.org/featuresartic1e/2006/01/427d3603-e7dd-4f5 f-bd9a-
56e6af73548f.html.
84 "Shia Chief Opposes Charter Change," BBC News, 12 Jan. 2006,
http://news.bbe.eo.uk/2/hi/middle_east!4605282.stm.
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cooperation in consociational governments. These evident flaws and uncooperative elite
eroded sectarian relationships and likely inhibited consociationalism's ability to unite
Sunni and Shi'a elite.
In addition to Horowitz, other critics argue that consociationalism's emphasis on
group identity and rights further solidify ethnic divisions. Political scientist Rob Aitken
claims that "institutional designs intended to promote representative government and
manage ethnic conflict have institutionalized ethnicity as a key resource in political
competition,,85 and thus "reinforc[e] ethnic identities and cemen[t] ethnic divisions.,,86
Citing the consociational Dayton Peace Accord, which addressed ethnic violence in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Aitken argues that the Agreement's "partition [of Bosnia-
Herzegovina] into separate ethnic identities was only inevitable because of the ethnic
framing of the problem.,,87 As such, Aitken believes that consociational governments
overemphasize ethnicity and further segment societal ethnic divisions. If Aitken's claims
are true, efforts at Iraqi consociationalism may have been self-destructive as their
emphasis on ethnic and religious power-sharing may have further intensified Iraqi
divisions.
Aitken believes that consociational efforts did further strain Sunni-Shi'a relations.
He claims that the efforts to practice power-sharing "informally along ethnic and
sectarian lines... [has] produced a pattern of ethnic politics,,88 which thwart future efforts
to ameliorate inter-ethnic relationships. Dr. Marina Ottaway agrees and argues that
85 Dr. Rob Aitken, "Cementing Divisions? The Impacts ofInternational Intervention on Ethnic Identities
and Divisions," 2007. http://www.psa.ac.uk/2007/pps/Aitken.pdf.
86 Dr. Rob Aitken. "Cementing Divisions? The Impacts of International Intervention on Ethnic Identities
and Divisions." 2007. http://www.psa.ac.uk/2007/pps/Aitken.pdf.
87 Dr. Rob Aitken, "Cementing Divisions? The Impacts ofInternational Intervention on Ethnic Identities
and Divisions," 2007. http://www.psa.ac.uk/2007/pps/Aitken.pdf.
88 Dr. Rob Aitken, "Cementing Divisions? The Impacts ofInternational Intervention on Ethnic Identities
and Divisions," 2007. http://www.psa.ac.uk/2007/pps/Aitken.pdf.
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while consociationalism may be successful at "preventing conflict from erupting,,,89 it
may simultaneously "perpetuat[e] the divisions and preven[t] the emergence of a national
identity.,,90 Unlike Horowitz, these critics believe that consociationalism can be
successfully implemented and avoid violent ethnic conflict, but they also believe that its
implementation could simultaneously further solidify ethnic divisions. In light of Iraq's
salient ethnic and religious divisions, claims that consociationalism could further divide
ethnic groups are relevant. Examination of the role of Sunni elite reveals that Iraq's
attempt at consociationalism did solidify ethnic divisions.
Given the attitudes of Shi'a leaders al-Sadr and aI-Hakim, these theoretical
concerns about consociationalism's role in entrenching ethnic divisions have practical
relevance. Study of the Sunni response to Sadr and Hakim's demonstrated inability to
share power with Sunnis reveals that the inability ofShi'a leadership to cooperate has
prompted increased sectarian divisions in Iraq. With a Shi'a majority in power in 2006,
Sunnis felt "displaced because of the loss of their traditional position of power within
Iraq [and] ...unsure whether to seek their aims through political participation or through
violent insurgency.',9l Sunni hesitation about utilization of the political process to
address concerns about de-Ba'athification and federalism are understandable in context
of Hakim's refusal to discuss Sunni's proposed amendments to the constitution. With
increasing Sunni resentment about the constitution and an uncooperative Shi'a elite, it
89 "Consociational Democracy: The Lebanese Experience and the Iraqi Endeavor," Institute of World
Affairs, Nov. 2006. http://www.iwa.org/Publications/Lectures/full%20roundtable%20report-
%20Consociational%20Democracy.pdf.
90 "Consociational Democracy: The Lebanese Experience and the Iraqi Endeavor," Institute of World
Affairs, Nov. 2006. http://www.iwa.org/Publications/Lectures/full%20roundtable%20report-
%20Consociational%20Democracy.pdf.
91 James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward- A New
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appears that consociational efforts have entrenched ethnic divisions in Iraq and
fragmented society.
This resulting intensified ethnic conflict is especially evident in the attitudes of
Sunni leaders Tariq al-Hashimi and Sheik Harith al-Dhari. Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-
Hashimi is respected by many in his communities but has been unable or unwilling to
work with Shi'a leaders. Despite Hashimi's claim to want to "talk [about] Iraqis rather
than to talk [about] Sunni and to talk [about] Shi'a,,92 he complains about some Iraqis'
view that "[Shi'a] should exercise exclusively the power, and there should be no
contribution, no participation from other communities, Sunni and the rest.,,93 Despite his
preference for a united Iraq, Hashimi's concerns about Shi'a domination are evident.
Furthermore, like many Sunnis, Hashimi does not believe that the current government
can accommodate the needs of the Sunni community. In a consociational government,
elite cooperation and faith in the political system is essential, but Hashimi believes "from
the beginning, the Sunni community has been marginalized... and this - the current
government.. .is deep in this marginalization.,,94 While the attitudes of Shi'a leaders,
especially Sadr and Hashimi, may legitimize Hashimi's concerns, his reluctance to
believe in the government's ability to address Sunni concerns illustrates decreased faith
in and legitimacy of the Iraq constitution and government. Hashimi's reaction to
uncooperative Shi' a leadership evidences the intensified prominence of ethnic divisions
92 "A Conversation with Tariq al-Hashimi," Council on Foreign Relations. (New York: 19 Dec. 2006).
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12304/conversation_with_tariCLalhashimiJush_transcript_federal_news_se
rvice.html.
93 "A Conversation with Tariq al-Hashimi," Council on Foreign Relations. (New York: 19 Dec. 2006).
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12304/conversation_with_tariCLalhashimiJush_transcriptjederal_news_se
rvice.html.
94 "CNN Presents: A Progress Report: The Iraq War," Transcript Online ofInterview. 22 July 2005.
http://transcripts.cnn.comlTRANSCRlPTS/0507/22/cp.0 l.html.
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in Iraq, thus further hindering substantive progress toward overcoming Sunni-Shi'a
sectarian rift.
Likewise, Sheik Harith al-Dhari, a Sunni cleric and the chair of the Association of
Muslim Scholars, has been a strong critic of the post-Saddam Iraqi government and has
been accused of supporting violent insurgents' response. Angered by the government's
Shi'a domination and Shi'a militia attacks on Sunnis, Dhari claimed in 2006 that "the
political process that the security of Iraq is depending upon is a failing process, so that is
why the security is failing and deteriorating.,,95 With his belief that the government is
inadequate, Dhari has utilized other means to voice his strong opposition to the
constitution and Shi'a policies of de-Ba'athification and federalism. Because Hakim and
other Shi'a leaders like aI-Hakim would not entertain Sunni concerns and Sunni leaders
distrust the government, leaders like Dhari have "emerged as a vocal representative of
Sunni defiance and anger.,,96 Dhari's concerns echo the hesitations ofSunnis throughout
Iraq who fear that Shi'a domination will exclude them from sharing power or
participating in governments. His distrust of the government has caused him to allegedly
incite ethnic violence, and the Shi'a government issued a warrant for his arrest in
November 2006. Regardless of Dhari's culpability for these crimes, his outspoken
criticism of the Shi'a government and sympathy for Sunni reactions demonstrates that as
a result of uncooperative Shi' a leaders, Sunni leaders believe ethnic divisions are more
relevant. Although the consociational framework itself did not increase this tension,
95 Louise Roug and Borzou Daraghi, "Iraq's Shiite-led Regime Seeks to Arrest Top Sunni Cleric," Los
Angeles Times. 17 Nov. 2006. http://www.latimes.comlnews/nationworld/worldl1a-fg-
iraqgovt17nov17,0,1 025932.story?col1=la-home-headlines.
96 Louise Roug and Borzou Daraghi, "Iraq's Shiite-led Regime Seeks to Arrest Top Sunni Cleric," Los
Angeles Times. 17 Nov. 2006. http://www.latimes.comlnews/nationworldlworldl1a-fg-
iraqgovt17nov17,0,1 025932.story?col1=la-home-headlines.
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insufficient elite cooperation in the new government prompted Sunnis to react angrily
against Shi'as, minimizing the possibility for a peaceful power-sharing arrangement.
This affirms Aitken's and Ottaway's concerns about consociational governments and
explains some of the factors for increasing sectarian violence and decreased faith in the
government.
Aitken's, Ottaway's and Horowitz's criticisms about consociationalism highlight
the lack of elite cooperation in Iraq and the resulting increased sectarian tension. Though
these criticisms could be applicable to any country attempting a consociational
government, the actions of Iraq's political elite make them especially relevant. Based on
Moqtada al-Sadr's violent Mahdi Army and Hakim's refusal to consider Sunni
constitutional amendments, Horowitz' concerns about elite cooperation seem justified.
Sadr's and Hakim's actions have intensified Sunni concerns, leading to a lack of faith in
the Iraqi government, as Hashimi evidences, and ethnically-charged violent resentment
from leaders like Dhari.
XIII. CROSS-CULTURAL CONSOCIATIONAL SUCCESS
Since consociationalism was attempted in Iraq despite incongruence with
Lijphart's favorable factors, it is important to evaluate whether it could have worked in
Iraq under any circumstances. Examination of consociational attempts in other countries
rejects this possibility. In addition to its success in The Netherlands, consociationalism's
implementation and relative successes at creating cross-community governmental
involvement in non-western countries including Lebanon, India and South Africa
evidences that the theory is applicable in a variety of geo~aphicregions. Specifically,
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examination of Lebanon's consociational efforts suggests that Iraq's geographic location
and .Middle East culture do not exclude the possibility of successful consociationalism.
Furthermore, although Lebanon's consociational National Pact did not result in
lasting stability, its 47 years of success suggests that power-Sharing arrangements can
avoid the type of sectarian divisions that have plagued Iraq. Despite both Middle Eastern
countries' adoption of a consociational government, Lebanon enjoyed much greater
success than Iraq did. Furthermore, Lebanon's eventual problems with consociationalism
resulted from structural flaws in the government that resulted in the overrepresentation of
one religious group in Parliament. Specifically, the turmoil in Lebanon was "partly
rooted in the disparity of Muslim-Christian representation in the top elite, because of a
perceived increase in the Muslim segment of the population since the census of 1932.'.97
Given this cause for Lebanon's instability in the late twentieth century, the failure
stemmed from noncompliance with Lijphart's criteria of proportionality, instead of
problems inherent to consociationalism. Given this historical and cross-cultural
perspective about implementation of consociational democracies, claims that the model is
inherently unsuited for Iraq appear to be incorrect. Specifically, Lebanon's long-term
success with the National Pact and its management of ethnic and religious differences
provides regionally relevant evidence that a form of consociationalism can work in the
Middle East, and therefore, is theoretically possible in Iraq.
While Horowitz's, and Aitken and Ottaway's criticisms of the model are
compelling, especially in Iraq, consociationalism's ranging degrees of success in other
countries refutes the notion that these problems always accompany attempts at power-
97 Richard Hrair Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon," Comparative
Politics, 10.2 (Jan, 1978), 251-265. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-
4159%28197801%2910%3A2%3C251%3ACDICTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W.
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sharing governments. Lebanon's experience, like those of other consociational
governments, reveals that the model could have worked in Iraq had procedural problems
and had an uncompromising political elite not hindered cooperation.
PART VII: CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
XIV. ApPLYING LESSONS FROM ATTEMPTED IRAQI CONSOCIATIONALISM
Application of Lijphart's criteria to Iraq's constitution reveals that the established
government mostly adhered to the principles of consociational theory. Despite its lacking
provisions for minority veto rights, Iraq's constitution prioritizes Lijphart's criteria of
regional autonomy, proportionality and a grand coalition of governing elites. As such,
Iraq could have more closely complied with Lijphart's model, but met enough criteria to
be considered mostly consociational.
Despite the constitution's consociational provisions, Iraq's inability to
successfully promote cross-community power-Sharing and stability reveals that additional
efforts must supplement Lijphart's criteria. Specifically, Iraq's constitutional process and
the procedure of creating and implementing consociationalism proved problematic
because they alienated Sunni political elite. While Lijphart's consociational criteria does
not outline an ideal process for constructing a power-Sharing government, the failure in
Iraq suggests that as far as possible, the procedure of implementing consociationalism
must be designed to facilitate elite cooperation. In Iraq's constitutional drafting process,
Sunnis' perceived exclusion further intensified already prominent ethnic tensions. Such
strain does not foster the elite cooperation necessary to maintain a power-sharing
government. These strains suggest that future consociational efforts must be careful to be
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inclusive and attempt to adhere to Lijphart's principles of proportionality in the drafting
process. Additionally, Iraq's constitutional ratification process, Sunni opposition and
resulting alienation after the constitution's passage reveals that the process of establishing
consociationalism should adhere to the spirit, if not the letter, of the principle of minority
veto. Sunni's inability to block passage of the constitution despite overwhelming
opposition resulted in diminished faith in the government, a major barrier to the
successful implementation of power-sharing. Such intense opposition from a specific
community implies that application of the constitution will likewise face opposition, and
thus decrease the chances of successfully preventing ethnic conflict through the new
government. The constitutional drafting and ratification process alienated Sunni elite and
contributed to the failure of consociationalism.
In addition to the procedural problems highlighted through the attempt at
consociationalism, analysis of Iraq in light of Lijphart,s favorable factors for its
successful implementation suggests that predictions for its success have been overly
optimistic. Though Lijphart's theoretical claim that consociationalism could work even
in country where democracy seems unpromising is difficult to disprove - and its relative
success in other countries supports his claim - Iraq's noncompliance with his favorable
factors implies that they may be more important that Lijphart admits. Lijphart's claim
that segmental isolation, small population, a balance of power and external threats hinge
upon their role in the facilitation of elite cross-community cooperation. Though these
factors cannot be induced, other efforts to foster elite cooperation ought to be more
prioritized. For example, efforts to create dialogue between Shi'a and Sunni leaders in
the constitutional drafting phase could have created more amicable elite relationships.
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Additionally, the Iraq Study Group Report echoes McGarry and O'Leary's assertions
about the important role of benign external actors. Though this was not attempted in Iraq,
the 2006 failure of Iraqi consociationalism implies that involvement from regional actors
perceived as well-intentioned could have fostered additional Iraqi investment in the new
government.
Additionally, though consociationalism has been implemented worldwide with
ranging degrees and timeframes of success, a lack of elite cooperation exacerbated
theoretical flaws with Lijphart's model. Specifically, Horowitz's concern that
consociational governments are unfeasible because they lack sufficient motivation for
elite cooperation was especially relevant. Shi'a leaders, like Moqtada al-Sadr and Abdul
Aziz aI-Hakim demonstrated an unwillingness to work constructively with Sunnis and
address Sunni concerns.
This lack of cooperation further intensified ethnic divisions and further prevented
the successful implementation of Iraqi consociationalism. This entrenchment of ethnic
divisions, a second criticism of consociationalism, was especially evident in Sunni
leadership's disillusionment with the government. Sunni leaders Tariq al-Hashimi and
Sheik Harith al-Dhari's belief that the government does not address their communities
concerns has prompted alienation from the Shi'a community. Such erosion of inter-
ethnic trust damaged relationships and further prevented consociationalism's successful
implementation.
Iraq's inability to implement consociationalism has resulted from procedural
errors in the constitutional process, an uncooperative political elite, and made inherent
flaws in the model especially relevant. Consociationalism has not united Iraq because its
....
implementation process did not foster elite cooperation and the theory's flaws - and
specifically the possibility that institutions designed to allow groups to organize
separately and cooperate may strengthen inter-group confrontation - were especially
evident with the Iraqi elite. The constitutional process and the salience of these
theoretical flaws intensified Shi'a-Sunni rifts, thereby preventing a power-sharing
government.
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APPENDIXA. IRAQ'S ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
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APPENDIX B. LIJPHART'S FAVORABLE FACTORS FOR CONSOCIATIONALISM.
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APPENDIX C. IRAQ'S ETHNO-RELIGIOUS GROUPS.
100 "Iraq: Ethnoreligious Groups," Iraq Map a Folio, CIA, Accessed via University of Texas Library (1992),
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraCLethnoreligious_1992.jpg
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